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Rabu, 14 Agustus 2013

The Benefits and Threats of PBB: An Assessment of Modern Reform

By JAMES FIELDING SMITH

James Fielding Smith is at the Henry County Public Service Authority, P.O. Box 7, Collinsville, VA
24078. E-mail address: jfsmith@neocom.net

PBB is more vulnerable to threats from fraud, falsification, and misrepresentation than
were previous budgeting systems. Vulnerability grows from complexity, dependence
on performance data, year-to-year changes in strategic focus, and the great expansion
of the numbers of kinds of specialists involved in the process. It appears to grow out
of PBB's widely recognized benefits. Transparency has been put forward as the primary
protective device against threats to PBB; however, this has problems with both
definition and operationalization. The fix may be a number of coordinated measures,
most importantly the inculcation of sound ethical standards throughout an organization
using PBB.

Growing from a desire to improve service and the efficient utilization of resources,
performance-based budgeting (PBB), sometimes also called performance budgeting,
has begun to penetrate all levels of government. The following definition from the
State of Maine captures both the meaning and flavor of PBB:

Performance budgeting links spending to results. Unlike line-item budgeting, it does not budget
around categories of spending . . . nor does it use the previous year's budget as a starting point.
Performance budgeting allocates resources based on achieving specific measurable outcomes.
Rather than asking 'what will be needed in personnel and other costs to carry out an assigned
task?' The first question is 'what is the outcome to be achieved?' Thus performance budgeting
first asks not 'how many people do we expect to put through a job training program?' or 'how
many permits have to be issued to protect this river?' but rather, 'how many people do we intend
to place in jobs?' or 'how many miles of river will be fishable and swimmable?' The number of
people placed in jobs and the miles of river that are fishable and swimmable are outcomes and
they are the basis of performance budgets.... Outcomes are defined through a strategic planning
process that considers the critical issues facing an agency, the agency's capabilities, and input
from stakeholders such as citizens, customers, legislators, and employees.'

From a handful of mostly state programs prior to 1990, PBB has spread to nearly all
states,^ the federal govemment, and many local governments, special use districts, and
non-governmental organizations.^ PBB may soon be the de facto standard for public
budgeting. Many perceive PBB as clearly superior in an atmosphere of resource constraint
for optimizing both the effectiveness and the efficiency of programs. Down
slope agencies feel the cumulative effects of PBB's enthronement in federal rules
governing transfer payments, grants, delegations, and devolution of powers or programs.
Less obviously, yoking budgeting and strategic planning so directly in PBB has
nearly doubled the direct constituency that chooses or implements budgeting systems.
Accepting as a given that PBB is superior to previous budgeting systems, an assumption
that probably deserves serious examination elsewhere, this article addresses
the premise that PBB is more vulnerable to threats from fraud, falsification, and
misrepresentation to earlier budgeting systems. An examination of the sources and
types of this vulnerability will lead to a proposed approach to preventing fraud, falsification,
and misrepresentation. This article will review the potential threat mechanisms,
the magnitude of the possible threats, and possible countermeasures.

SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY
Each advantage or benefit of PBB seems to introduce at least one new risk or threat to
data integrity, as is shown in Table 1 on the following page. The sources of vulnerability
fall roughly into four categories: (1) same as other budgeting systems but heightened;
(2) introduced from strategic planning; (3) unique to PBB; and (4) temporary, or
learning curve, problems.

Same as Other Budgeting Systems but Heightened
Any threat operating in line-item, program, performance, or other budgeting system
will also threaten data integrity in PBB. Although the more rigorous degree of priority
setting in PBB will make fewer data points or streams appear vulnerable and needing
protection, PBB's explicitly defined linkages of fiscal data to performance data can
enable amplification and ramification of errors, thereby heightening their effects. Managers,
budgeters, and planners dealing with PBB should try to build on past experience
in evaluating vulnerabilities and agency responses.
Organizational structure or behavior may harbor threats to data integrity in any
budgeting system. All budgeting systems suffer from the results of a lack of incentives
for team implementation; for example, the assignment of non-overlapping, strictly
individual responsibility for each task and subtask. This remnant of the managementby-
objective culture can affect data integrity in PBB by distorting performance measures
to follow organizational units or chains of command more exactly than do the
organization's processes. Despite its potential for promoting teamwork, PBB remains
vulnerable to parochialism. Lee, Melkers, and Willoughby, in assessing state budget

practices, have noted changes to traditional budgetary relationships to respond to
PBB's special requirements.''
Temporal relationships affect the applicability of long-term or trend analysis to any
budgeting system for detecting aberrations in budgeting. However, as budgeting has
evolved from line-item to PBB, the focus has shifted on categories labeled with major
missions and away from a stable list of line-items. As the major goals evolve and
change from budget cycle to budget cycle, systemic trends may be obscured by the
more obvious changes in higher categories. Another environmental example would be
the succession of major emphasis programs in water quality since 1972: primary
treatment, then, following at roughly four to five year intervals, secondary treatment,
nutrient removal, toxicity, and currently, metals and animal waste. Each new focus
brings very different outcomes and outcome measures, even if the most basic process—
here, processing permits—carries on throughout. Budgets inevitably change
from year to year as programs and subprograms grow, reach maturity, and end. Temporal
changes can greatly complicate year-to-year comparisons and long-term analysis.

Introduced from Strategic Planning
Just as PBB shares categories of threats with earlier budgeting systems, it also shares
threats inherent to strategic planning. Oversimplification and temporal inconstancy, as
noted above, along with parochialism apply but become particularly important in the
key strategic planning functions of stating vision, articulating a mission statement, and
specifying goals and objectives. Any problem affecting or even shading the operationalization
of these higher concepts represents a particular threat to PBB. For twenty-six
years the ultimate goal of the Clean Water Act has been to make all the waters of the
United States "fishable" and "swimmable," but these terms have undergone periodic
redefinition to fit changing economic realities, technological advances, shifts in programmatic
emphasis, national policies, and relations between EPA and the states. Each
redefinition would have affected PBB, had PBB been in use all this time.

Unique to PBB
PBB's own special sources of threat come most directly from PBB's complexity.
Everyone advertises PBB as procedurally transparent and logically accessible, and
these characterizations do apply to the basic concept. However, building, maintaining,
and managing a PBB system involve daunting levels of complexity. Each little niche
of complexity can become an opportunity for error, fraud, falsification, or misrepresentation.
These key data processes can be disrupted or distorted in any segment of
PBB: strategic planning, defining performance measures, reporting performance data,
reporting or apportioning expense data, classifying outcomes, defining of success,
developing budgets, implementing the budget correction process, analyzing performance
data, analyzing cost data, and other areas.

Because of this complexity and the number of major skills—virtually separate specialized
careers—involved, no one person or type of specialist can master the whole
PBB system. Teamwork by necessity could result from this but, on the other hand, no
one manager can master and oversee all the contributory processes.
PBB, when it makes fiscal performance links, creates a problem where none existed
before. Separately, performance auditing and financial auditing have developed to
serve the needs of their targeted substrates; however, performance auditing is significantly
less well developed as a technique and as a field than financial auditing. This is
true even in the private corporate sector where, under the term "management accounting,"
performance auditing has long been practiced. Combining financial and performance
auditing for PBB can create mismatches and lacunae, allowing threats, which
were not threats to the separate branches, to function. Comprehensive auditing for
PBB will require many new techniques and approaches. For example, consider the
challenges of erecting confidence limits around correlations within a model.
PBB works better than other budgeting systems because it drives out the superfluous
and not required, matching funding with real priority projects. However, by undercutting
traditional politics to do this, PBB seems likely to accentuate politicization of
goals within the organization. Internal politicization may, in turn, link up with traditional
politics. Regardless, politicized competition for funding may engender, at least
among the more farsighted participants, a high degree of politicization of selection and
wording of perfonnance measures, both in the appropriation and authorization phases
and in the public accounting and electioneering phases. Whether politicization in this
case equates to hyperbole will depend on leadership and the culture of the organization.
Specific threats to data integrity. Data integrity faces challenges from unintentional
errors as well as from intentional ones, and sometimes the two types get confounded.
Error also operates both on concept, e.g., theories, models, linkages, cause-and-effect,
and on data. Errors in concepts generally create more dastardly results partly because
they propagate themselves like computer viruses every time they are used in a calculation
or analysis. Confounding of conceptual errors and misrepresentation can also
occur. A rascal, wanting to twist the outcomes of PBB, might yield to the temptation to
create a distortion in embedded concepts. Such misrepresentation, if discovered, might
possibly appear to be a conceptual error, an honest mistake, or the result of a legitimate
difference in interpretation. Data point manipulation to obtain the same level of misrepresentation
almost certainly would exhibit both difficulty of detection and ease of
explanation once detected. Fortunately, errors in concept can easily be detected by
rather simple countermeasures, as will be seen below.
Errors in operationalization of measures are to conceptual error as tactics are to
strategy. Both intentional and unintentional errors can occur here but have less widespread
consequence to PBB integrity than conceptual errors. Ways in which this may
occur include the selection of wrong measures, the use of erroneous modeling assumptions
for complex indicators (e.g., using principal component analysis), the omission of key aspects, the use of inconsistent or inadequate baselines, or the application of
incorrect transformations or inflators. A special case of operationalization error results
from costing errors, especially those involving the misassignment or incomplete distribution
of costs. Abstract aggregation of variables creates performance measures that
are hard to understand out of context. For example, a state environmental agency
might have a goal of a 60 percent return to compliance within one year, which summarizes
thousands of facilities covered by over a dozen permitting and regulatory programs,
not even accounting for the many difficulties inherent in defining a key term
like "compliance."
Some activities can directly inject error into PBB data, as with any other complex
dynamic model or data system. In sample shopping someone selectively forwards data
or selectively discards data. This may result in areal, temporal, or quality misrepresentation
of phenomena. Data fudging involves the direct manipulation of the data to
change its import or meaning. All data points remain, but some or all may undergo
illegitimate change. Both sample shopping and data fudgings how the overall effect of
changing the characteristics of groups of data, e.g., means, medians, measures of
dispersion.

Temporary, or Learning Curve, Problems

PBB seems to ignite a search for completeness and specificity, which may initially
result in over complicated definitions, models, and performance measures. This may
obfuscate essential relationships or, as simplification sets in with program maturity,
lead to discontinuities in baselines and data interpretation.
Newness itself may create error. Most often resulting from a lack of adequate
training or from the overselling of PBB's benefits, this effect can express itself as
misplaced effort, misunderstood directions, procrastination, or approximation, any of
which can cause a differentially higher data error rate in a new system.
Uncertainty of consequences. All organizations newly using PBB, and perhaps
some veteran users, experience uncertainty about the consequences of missing performance
targets. The full range of uncertain consequences must be considered: more or
less funding, dumbed-down targets, loss of confidence, restructuring, morale, reprisals,
or punishing headlines, plus a large range of opportunity costs. Through such uncertainty,
PBB creates another layer of rewards, incentives, and disincentives, possibly
motivating distortions in data. The uncertainty concerning consequences may express
itself, however, in uncertain directions, distorting data either upward or downward,
depending on expectations. Uncertainty and politicization may interact, potentiating
the effects. The extent of uncertainty's effects will depend on whether the sign of the
effects is known accurately throughout the organization, which can take place through
policy, training, documentation, or informal diffusion. The contrarian notion that uncertainty
promotes honesty seems to be unverifiable, at least in the context of PBB.

MISREPRESENTATION

Among all sources of error, the misrepresentation of results undoubtedly causes the
most significant compromises of integrity. Misrepresentation occurs when someone,
who has at least enough authority to make a point stick, claims that the results really
mean something other than what systematic analysis can support. No level of data or
analysis can escape vulnerability to misrepresentation, and at the highest level misrepresentation
gets fed directly to the media and to decision making bodies such as
legislatures. Misrepresentation can have profound costs for an organization. The costs
operate in many dimensions: loss of credibility, program compromise, and future
appropriations, for example. Despite such risks, misrepresentation occurs depressingly
often, and PBB may goad desperate managers into trying to make their organizations
appear more competitive, more effective, or more efficient than reality supports.
Unfortunately, misrepresentation breeds. Managers, technical staff, customer support
staff, and clerical staff throughout an organization can be infected by the willingness
to countenance misrepresentation. Lingering effects of management by objective
may precondition some to be vulnerable to misrepresentation.
Reengineering applications. A special source of vulnerability comes from the high
degree of compatibility, or perhaps suitability, of using PBB as a primary tool during
the reengineering of organizations. PBB's unique powers to drive and reinforce
changes in vision, mission, and organization also have consequences for data integrity.
The high stress environment surrounding reengineering may increase incentives for
misrepresentation or distorted definitions of performance measures, thereby accentuating
problems in PBB implementation. This special linkage between PBB and
reengineering verges on co-dependency and merits careful monitoring.
In summary, PBB's vulnerabilities result from complexity, dependence on performance
data, and year-to-year changes in strategic focus, exacerbated by the great
expansion of the budgeting constituency to include strategic planners and many more
levels of managers. This expanded corps must deal not only with new career
subspecialties but also with newly important interactions among budgeting, strategic
planning, and operations.

COUNTERMEASURES

PBB's complexity invites, or perhaps demands, automation. Not only does automation
facilitate the necessary data flows and analysis, but it can also include programming
for error detection, inconsistencies, and other forms of QA/QC. However, automation
adds to the problem. It can hide manipulations and assumptions. It can give a false
sense of objectivity, sometimes carelessly equated with accuracy. It can reduce
thoughtful analysis while simultaneously promoting it.

Awareness

Awareness encompasses a range of countermeasures. Its most elemental form entails
disseminating knowledge of threats to the entire user community or to key subcommunities.
Many tools can contribute to awareness campaigns, from posters to position
performance expectations, and from caveats written in budgets to comments in budget
briefings. Of the fourteen states listed by NASBO as being primarily PBB-using, ten
had sites on the Internet as of March 17, 1998.^ Examination of nine of these showed
seven to have a statement of the importance of awareness of threats to data integrity,
but none went beyond the statement. There appeared to be a tacit assumption that the
mechanisms in place for protecting fiscal and performance data would suffice for PBB.

Competition and Cooperation

The intense levels of competition implicit in the priority setting process of PBB should
have the ancillary effects of countering threats to integrity. In this competitive atmosphere,
each rival mission and program can expect scrutiny from competitors. The
overall process should squeeze padding and excess, reducing the number and capacity
of internal hiding places for error. As a result, opportunities for successful misrepresentation
should shrink even though some competitors may succumb to the temptation
of sweetening their models or data up front.
Cooperation and teamwork can yield a de facto countermeasure against threats to
PBB integrity. Like most tools discussed herein, they could also subvert the process,
depending on leadership and organizational culture. Such an effort would involve a
conspiracy, a possibility both remote and outside the scope of this paper. Cooperation
among specialists and the resultant teamwork ought to yield shared knowledge and
mutual respect, which will support data and procedural integrity.

Openness

Openness consists of many elements, each of which can contribute to protecting PBB
integrity. The more steps and procedures done in the open, the greater the effort it will
take to propagate fraud, falsification, and misrepresentation. Accessibility of the process,
especially of strategic planning and fiscal-performance linkages, reinforces integrity,
partly through coincidental inspection, citizen scrutiny, and feelings of ownership
in the widest possible range of stakeholders. Clarity means a combination of understandability
and logic. It requires clear statements of consequences, or lack thereof,
and of what outcomes are "good."

Comprehensive Auditing

Since PBB combines existing budgeting, strategic planning, and operational monitoring
techniques, the same auditing and QA/QC tools already used with those techniques
are ready for application to PBB. The problems arise with trying to keep up with a
moving target—after all, PBB is most highly touted for its ability to deal with an
organization undergoing change—and with coping with the linkages and interactions
among fiscal and performance variables. Notwithstanding preexisting tools for auditing
and the challenge of programmatic change, comprehensive auditing presents the
same fundamental Demingesque problem when applied to PBB as when applied, perhaps
in the guise of systematic or intensive inspections, to any process; inspections, no
matter how intense or skillful, can only find the errors but have severely limited
abilities to find the sources of errors. Similar effort invested in inspections will yield
less result in quality or accuracy than a commitment to a process of continuous improvement,
which, in turn, involves awareness, commitment, innovation, and imagination.
Comprehensive auditing will always have a place in PBB to satisfy legal audit
requirements on the fiscal end and, increasingly, on the performance end. When automated,
comprehensive auditing forms the basis of most QA/QC routines and can
estimate random error in the system. On the other hand, systematic error will persist
unless rooted out by something like a continuous improvement process.

Politicization

The accentuated politicization that characterizes the priority setting phase of PBB
offers a remarkably strong tool for detecting and sometimes correcting errors in the
PBB system and data. In this case, politics acts as a public watchdog. This tool
probably acts most strongly when PBB deals with severely constrained total resources
and under conditions of openness.
Politicization may come into play in one rare but powerful way of limiting some
threats to PBB integrity: the intelligent exemption of certain types of programs from
PBB. Despite PBB having been sold as a universally applicable system, some programs
should go into sanctuaries so that the pressures of competition for resources and
performance evaluations do not have any opportunity to distort data or program management.
This draconian solution may have few legitimate applications. Enforcement
programs come to mind as a legitimate candidate because of their fragility, sensitivity,
and lack of control over workloads and the timing of outcomes. Timing's particular
importance arises out of cost-efficiency being the underlying principle of PBB and
time being a critical factor in computing any measure of cost efficiency on both the
cost and performance sides.

TRANSPARENCY

Qne last major category of corrective action remains: transparency. Transparency,
often put forward as the primary protective device, or even panacea, against threats to
PBB, has problems of both definition and operationalization. Transparency has attracted
many shadings of meaning ranging from "obvious" to "entirely in the back-
ground." Peter Droege offers this definition, "Transparency should denote in an ideal
situation: (1) public accessibility of data, (2) the actively managed interpretation of
process and structure, and (3) public announcements as part of an accountability program,
with facilitated discussions of assumptions, process, and implications of outcomes
or decisions."^ Don Krueckeberg says it "involves procedures which are easy to
follow, guided by rules that seem necessary and make sense, no hidden consequences."'
The present author proposes transparency to be a process in which the steps
are visibly or clearly linked to the mission or vision of the organization. Transparency
is a portmanteau that can be deconstructed into many of the concepts described earlier
in this article. Transparency is a desirable and maybe necessary condition, but it is not
a sufficient condition for data integrity.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

A pair of critically important questions arise: "Why do organizations in the corporate
sector not encounter the problems identified in this article?" and "But if they do, why
don't they care?"* The same budgeting practices—both systems and corrective measures—
have been used widely in the private sector, where the participants cannot be
assumed to be more skillful or more ethical, without encountering the problems identified
in this article. A survey of articles published in Management Accounting between
October 1994 and December 1997 revealed only one article specifically on data integrity,
ethics, or fraud.^ Such findings in the most topical journal in the private sector
may indicate a very high degree of confidence in the integrity of data in PBB in the
private sector. One theory to explain this might be that private organizations assume
that competitive pressure ruthlessly seeks greater efficiency, which drives out major
inefficiencies such as data threats create.

Does this theory apply in the public sector? Consider this argument, which applies
only to the public sectors in democracies. Efficiency and democracy are fundamentally
incompatible, as democracy is never the most efficient way to run anything and its due
process safeguards inherently add inefficiencies to all other public processes. Public
programs are the tools of democracy. They may be forced to try to become more
efficient and otherwise to copy the private sector model, but they are still tied to
democracy. Bureaucracy is where democracy tries to reconcile this conflict. PBB is
bureaucracy's bravest try to date to approach the private ideal, responsibility budgeting.
But due process and other safeguards interfere with pure competition, limiting
how close this approach gets to the ideal. PBB in the public sector therefore needs
countermeasures applied to avoid or control the threats to its integrity.
Klitgaard presents another viewpoint, one which deals with international cooperation
against corruption, necessarily combining private and public issues.'^ He looks at
a case in which data integrity, misrepresentation, fraud, and other issues occur in the
hothouse of monopolistic systems under pressure from bribery or other inducements to
cheat. The democracy-competition theory, although not explicit, undergirds the con-
cept of corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability, which is
Klitgaard's central thesis.'^ Concluding that corruption is a systemic problem,
Klitgaard proposes a systemic strategy, a strategy that could be characterized as ethical
education.

ETHICS AND THE CULTURE OF PBB

The fix may be a number of coordinated measures, most importantly the inculcation of
sound ethical standards throughout an organization using PBB. The basic problem is
cultural. Although PBB can create another layer of rewards, incentives, and disincentives,
it still operates within the organization's culture. Melkers and Willoughby found
only seven out of the fifty states have formal incentives and disincentives in their
budgeting systems.'^
A comprehensive program based on ethics is needed. All transactions within PBB
should pass the test: is there any hidden incentive for error or disincentive for ethical
behavior? Internal recognition and rewards programs bear examination in this light, as
do personnel policies, especially hiring, promotion, and discipline. Emphasis should
openly go to corrective measures taken to eliminate sources of error. Essentially all
training programs should include units or goals supporting ethical behavior.
The interplay between individual gain and organizational advancement is usually
assumed to be synergistically positive. This may not be true. Consider any case in
which organizational growth and survival will depend on favorable performance measures:
this might cause organizational momentum—an effect pervasive throughout the
organization—to swamp any effects of individual leaders. This is a strong argument
for the inculcation of ethics throughout the levels of an organization. It works both
ways, to restrain a rogue leader or to restrain a rogue organization. Ethics also need to
be fostered among and between agencies, as any one agency will rarely encompass all
of a policy area. Trans-organizational ethics may present the greatest challenge of all.
Many organizations still labor under the burdens of systematized distrust, which is
the legacy of MBO and theory X management. This legacy seriously impedes culture
change, as would be needed to mobilize ethics to protect the integrity of PBB. On the
other hand, its effects on morale and unit identity are often recognized within an
organization and could be used to energize cultural change. Mindless cutthroat competition,
as fostered by MBO, is a serious threat to PBB integrity.
Klitgaard's anti-corruption strategy combines punishing prominent offenders ("fry a
few big fish"), involving "the people" in diagnosing corrupt systems, focusing on
prevention by repairing systems, creating reform incentives, showing cultural units
they are not alone in these problems, mobilizing creative competition, and providing
"tool kits" filled with best practices for fighting corruption.'^ Klitgaard and this article
agree that disseminating awareness and analytical capabilities widely within organizations
or cultures gives the best protection against such things as fraud, falsification,
and misrepresentation. To the extent that transparency promotes these, transparency
contributes to the protection of PBB. Transparency alone, however, does not suffice.

PROSPECTS

PBB's perceived strengths and advantages come largely from its superior facility for
tracking environmental and programmatic change. It forces the size of programs to
what is appropriate now, or in the next budget cycle, and it imposes life cycles on
programs, ending programs that have finished their purpose or outlived it and bringing
on programs to fulfill new mandates or needs. PBB has a strong analog in the phenomena
of ecological succession, where resource constraints and changes create a more-orless
predictable sequence of biological populations or communities.
Despite possible problems, PBB with its overwhelming advantages in terms of
productivity remains the best approach around. In addition, PBB has palpably greater
philosophical soundness than other budgeting systems. It expresses the philosophy "if
it's not paid for, it's not real." And if it's not real, it shouldn't be paid for.
Is PBB more susceptible to fraud, falsification, and misrepresentation compared too
previous other budgeting systems? Yes. Can it be protected? Yes. A number of corrective
and preventive mechanisms, including the systematic promotion of ethics throughout
the organization, can protect PBB.









Example - Thesis Proposal

Thesis Proposal - An Example
Marwata, FEB UKSW Salatiga
marwata@staff.uksw.edu

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Topic and purpose
During the last 20 years, many governments have undertaken significant public sector
reform. A new paradigm known as New Public Management (NPM) first introduced
by OECD countries in the 1980s has brought significant changes to public sector
organizations. Hood (1991) (cited in Lapsley and Pallot, 2000b) describes NPM as a
new public management system with key dimensions such as disaggregation of
bureaucracy, short term employment on contract basis, adoption of private sector
management style and techniques, greater stress on frugality and discipline, greater
visibility, greater quantification, and greater emphasis on outputs.
NPM has implicated public sector accounting. As a new approach to public sector
management, the NPM paradigm represents fundamental shifts in management
structures, processes, and practices in the public sector towards that of private sector
approach. This fundamental change has redefined what the public sector is all about.
The role and the way the public sector are managed have changed. Under the
umbrella of NPM, new systems and symbols of accountability have emerged, and new
accounting visibilities have been created in the public sector spheres (Broadbent and
Guthrie, 1992). In such changes, accounting has been implicated and there are new
demands for the practices of accounting to make new organizational visibility and to
discipline performance (Hopwood, 1984). The introduction of NPM in the public
sector sphere has challenged public sector accounting to play a new role in the new
language of decision-making and public sector accountability. Although the basic
objectives of public sector accounting have not changed, given the change in the
environments in which accounting information is used, public sector accounting needs
to go forward in order to accomplish its objectives (Ruiz, 2000).
To support such a movement towards management practice convergence between
public and private sectors, governmental accounting in many nations has been
reformed. Accounting techniques that traditionally are being practiced in the private
sectors have been adopted by public sectors.

In the governmental financial accounting area, accrual accounting has been adopted
based on the argument that this accounting technology is capable of providing better
financial reports for decision-making and accountability. Accrual accounting, a
market oriented accounting technology, has widely been adopted by public sectors to
support the move towards market-oriented new public management around the world,
especially in developed countries. Accrual accounting has been adopted by public
sectors to support performance evaluation systems in the context of market-oriented
public sectors.
Accrual accounting adoption by the public sector in many developed countries is not a
stand-alone phenomenon. The adoption of accrual accounting by public sectors is
embedded within a wider set of public sector reforms. The adoption of accrual
accounting in developed countries is to support market-oriented new public
management informed by neoclassical economics paradigm. Accrual accounting
adoption can support the notion of contestable market, internal market, and
contracting out of public services by providing better services cost calculations
(Yamamoto, 2000). Within the NPM paradigm, public sector management is
evaluated based on performance, output, and outcomes. The tenure of public
organization managers is short term on a contract basis, and its renewal is based on
performance. Public sector management is driven by particular objectives. The role of
politician and bureaucrat is disaggregated. In such a disaggregated role, politicians
demand greater transparency of the use of public monies. To meet such a demand,
accrual accounting is suitable because accrual accounting has an advantage in
producing less biased and more transparent financial information than cash based
accounting (Yamamoto, 2000). It is in this context that accrual accounting is
mobilized. The intention of accrual accounting mobilization to the public sectors is to
support the “marketization” of public services, results-oriented accountability
regimes, performance evaluation systems, and greater demands for transparency.
Accrual accounting can serve well this intention by providing a set of financial
statements that cannot be provided by cash basis accounting systems such as balance
sheet and profit and loss.

Public sector reform is a global phenomenon. The language of NPM has spread
throughout many parts of the world, developed and developing countries. The spread
of NPM is the result of either political globalization or policy convergence (Common,
1998) or institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As far as
developing countries are concerned, however, Polidano and Hulme (1999) warn that
although we are witnessing public sector reforms in developing countries, such
reforms are unrelated or even contrary to the basic tenets of NPM. In a similar vein,
Cheung (2001) argues that, instead of NPM paradigm, state capacity paradigm is
more relevant to understand public sector reforms in developing countries,
particularly in Asian countries. While NPM type reforms drive public sectors of
developed countries toward market-oriented public sectors, public administration in
developing countries remains bureaucracy oriented. The idea of market in providing
public services is strange for most developing countries, particularly in the Asian
tradition in which economy and society are regarded as integral and organic parts of
the wider state (Cheung, 2001). Thus, the bureaucratic nature of public administration
in developing countries remains dominant, despite current public management reform
experimentation in many developing countries (Turner and Hulme, 1997).
The social, political, and cultural context of the public sector in developing countries
is different from that of developed countries (Turner and Hulme, 1997). Public sector
reforms in developing countries are non-NPM types of reforms (Polidano and Hulme,
1999; Cheung, 2001), public sector administration in developing countries is
dominated by Keynesian paradigm (Turner and Hulme, 1997), the notion of market is
strange (Cheung, 2001), governments are producers and distributors of services
(Riggs, 1964), the political and bureaucratic role is amalgamated within bureaucracy
institutions (Riggs, 1964; Turner and Hulme, 1997), the accountability regime is
compliance-oriented, and public sector performance evaluation systems are hardly
based on output.
Interestingly, while the nature of public sector reforms in developing countries is
different to that of developed countries, we are witnessing a convergence in the
direction of governmental financial accounting reforms. Notwithstanding differences
in the nature of the public administration, governmental sectors in both developed and 
developing countries are on the same course towards accrual accounting adoption. For
instance, since 2001 Indonesian local governments have been adopting accrual
accounting. Given that accounting as an institution has to be compatible with
exogenous factors such as social, political, and cultural context (Yamamoto, 2000;
Burchel et al., 1980), such a phenomenon is intriguing. We are witnessing a mixed
situation: Accrual accounting, a market-oriented accounting technology, is being
transplanted into a bureaucratic-oriented public sector environment.
In such a situation, there are several potential complications when accrual accounting
is to be adopted. For instance, bureaucrats might resist accrual accounting adoption
because accrual accounting creates new visibilities, it will expose things that have
been hidden under cash basis accounting, and it will depict bureaucratic malpractices.
Politicians might not give the support necessary for accrual accounting adoption
(Luders, 1992; Christensen, 2002) because there is no sufficient incentive to do so
(Jones, 1996) and that the actual political power is in the hands of bureaucrats (Riggs,
1964). Accrual based financial reports might not function properly because there is no
performance evaluation in a systematic way and the action of bureaucrats is more
guided by speculation than rational analysis (Turner and Hulme, 1997).
Such potential complications warrant attention and consideration. We are concerned
to understand the motivation, the intended and unintended consequences, and the full
range of ramifications when a bureaucratic-oriented public sector organization adopts
a market-oriented accounting technology such as accrual accounting. It is the
intention of the proposed study to explore these issues.

1.2. General aim
To gain holistic understanding of governmental financial accounting reforms in a
developing country context.
1.3. Specific objectives:
1. To explicate the emergence of accrual accounting in the public sectors in a
developing country context.
2. To explore the process by which accrual accounting is adopted by public sectors
in a developing country context.
a. To examine the context, events, and activities leading to a decision to
adopt accrual accounting in the public sectors in a developing country
context.
b. To examine the strategies, problems, and organizational dynamics in
managing the process of implementation of accrual accounting in the
public sector in a developing country context.
3. To explore the ramification of accrual accounting implementation in the public
sectors in a developing country context.
4. To analyze the role of accrual based financial reports in the accountability systems
in the public sector in a developing country context.
1.4. Significance and potential contribution of the study
Accrual accounting adoption by public sectors has been widely studied. Accrual
accounting adoption by governmental units has dominated the body of literature on
the governmental financial accounting reforms in the nineties. Various aspects of the
issue of the introduction of accrual accounting in the governmental units have been
discussed.
A significant body of literature has extensively debated whether accrual accounting
adoption by governmental units is appropriate or not. Some people have argued for
and against accrual accounting adoption by governmental units (see e.g. Richardson,
1996; Montesinos and Bargues, 1996; Ross and Kelly, 1996; Anthony, 1989; Mellor,
1996; Redburn, 1996; Strom, 1996; Jones, 1996; Guthrie, 1998, 1999). Some people
argue that accrual accounting and cash accounting should not be polarized. Instead, it
should be combined because the two are basically complementary (see e.g.
Christiaens and Vanhee, 2001).

Another body of literature has devoted to study the worth of accrual accounting
adoption by governmental units (see e.g. Christiaens, 2000; Ruiz, 2000; Carpenter and
Feroz, 2001, Guthrie, 1998). In general, these studies find that accrual accounting has
not brought any significant change in governmental organizational life.
Many attempts have been made to explore the contextual factors that affect the
likelihood of accrual accounting adoption by governmental units. In this regard, the
most significant contribution has been Luder’s (1992 contingency model of
governmental accounting innovation. The contingency model concerns how
governmental accounting changes in the light of politico-administrative factors that
conditioned them (Luder, 1992). In essence, the theory suggest that accrual
accounting adoption by governmental units is the outcome of an interaction between
stimuli of reform, social structural variables of a country, structural variables of
politico administrative systems, and implementation barriers. The body of literature
has proliferated under Luderian paradigm in the nineties (Chan, et al., 1996).
While the body of knowledge informed by Luder’s contingency model has focused on
analysis of contextual factors that influence the adoption of accrual accounting by
governmental sectors, some studies have given attention to the process of accrual
accounting adoption (see e.g. Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Christensen, 2002). Studies
on the process of accrual accounting adoption reveal that there is a dynamic process
involving extraorganizational and intraorganizational actors in the decision process to
adopt accrual accounting in the governmental sectors.
The extant literature, however, is mainly focused on the adoption of accrual
accounting in developed countries context. This is not surprising because accrual
accounting adoption by governmental sectors in developing countries is relatively
very recently. As such, accrual accounting adoption by governmental units has mostly
been studied in a market-oriented public sector environment. In such a context,
accrual accounting adoption by governmental sectors has been studied as part of
wider performance measurement systems of market-oriented public sectors. We are
lacking in knowledge on the ramifications of transplanting an accounting technology
with particular orientation into environment with different orientation. The proposed
study will fill this particular need.
I believe that addressing this issue will make us better informed on governmental
accounting developments especially in developing countries context. This study will
contribute to the body of literature on governmental accounting in general and
particularly in the developing country context, which has been seriously being
neglected in the extant literature. This study has the potential to provide a theory on
governmental accounting reforms in developing countries. This study will also
contribute to making those who are concerned with the development of governmental
accounting in developing countries aware of the nature of governmental accounting
innovation in developing countries. Particularly, international advocates and
institutions that frequently impose new technologies from developed countries,
including accrual accounting, to developing countries as part of loan schemes or
technical assistances should be benefited by this study.

KULIAH INGGRIS EKSEKUTIF





1.       Ide pokok paragraf pertama
Perkiraan burn rate sering digunakan untuk mempermudah perusahaan menilai suatu proyek dan membantu meningkatkan level perusahaan dimana pendapatan mulai dialirkan dari proyek tersebut.
Ide pendukung paragraf
-          Peranan vital berhubungan dengan kas (aliran kas keluar)
-          Menilai kondisi suatu perusahaan dilihat besaran ukuran pengeluaran perusahaan sehingga pengeluaran terlalu banyak menyebabkan pemborosan atau terlalu sedikit menyebabkan kekurangan dana dan tidak bisa beroperasi.
-          Dalam setiap proyek mempunyai tingkat resiko yang berbeda dan membutuhkan jangka waktu yang bervariasi untuk mengelola dana secara tepat.
2.       Ide pokok paragraf kedua
Ada hal yang perlu dilihat bahwa pendapatan dan penghematan biaya harus berdiri sendiri dan terpisah dari investasi dalam mewujudkan pertumbuhan yang berkelanjutan pada suatu proyek berdasarkan jangka waktunya.
Ide pendukung paragraf
-          Kebanyakan perusahaan-perusahaan baru berdiri tidak tahu untuk melihat suatu ramalan cashflow yang baik meskipun semuanya hanya berputar berkisar arus kas
-          Perusahaan perlu menghitung berapa jumlah kas dibutuhkan dan berapa lama bertahan dengan jumlah yang ada sampai dengan pendapatan yang didapat.
-          Periode burn rate satu tahun kurang biasanya tidak memungkinkan perusahaan untuk bisa memperbaiki semuanya bahkan sampai meningkatkan modal
3.       Ide pokok paragraf ketiga
Perkiraan burn rate dibuat berdasarnya bulanan, biasanya rincian dari arus kas masuk sama dengan arus kas keluar berdasarkan harian dalam tiap bulannya.
Ide pendukung paragraf
-          Perkiraan burn rate berguna untuk membantu suatu kondisi perusahaan tidak punya keterbatasan dalam kas yang tersedia.
-          Perkiraan burn rate akan membantu perusahaan mengelola investasi yang masuk sama seperti jalur hutang/kredit
-          Perkiraan burn rate cara terbaik menemukan suatu solusi dengan  tidak menghabiskan pada beban-beban yang  diambil dari proyeknya.
-          Cakupan burn rate untuk beberapa minggu lagi, perbulan dan perpanjangan jangka waktu yang demikian terhadap uang dan dampaknya aman dimanapun uang itu berada.
4.       Ide pokok paragraf
Burn rate yang tinggi akan berdampak negatif bagi prilaku karyawan perusahaan yang kemudian kredibilitas perusahaan itu.
-          Burn rate dan pertumbuhan modal perlu terus dimonitor secara seksama dan hal ini ditujukan untuk membantu mencapai perkiraan burn rate dan burn rate yang tinggi yang dihubungkan dengan pertumbuhan modal akan menyebabkan perusahaan menuju kebangkrutan sebelumnya meskipun itu akan diambil alih.

Sabtu, 27 Juli 2013

BUMD KOTA SALATIGA DAN KONTRIBUSINYA DALAM PENDAPATAN ASLI DAERAH

  A.   POTRET BUMN KOTA SALATIGA

Sampai dengan saat ini, Kota Salatiga memiliki 4 (empat) Perusahaan Daerah, yaitu  :

1.      PD BPR BKK Sidorejo, Salatiga
2.      Perusahaan Daerah  Bank BPR Kota Salatiga,
3.      Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (PDAM) Kota Salatiga
4.      Perusahaan Daerah Aneka Usaha (PDAU) Kota Salatiga
Profil Perusahaan Daerah Kota Salatiga dapat digambarkan sebagai berikut :
1.    Perusahaan Daerah Bank Kredit Kecamatan (PD BKK) Sidorejo
Perusahaan Daerah Bank Kredit Kecamatan (PD BKK) Sidorejo didirikan sejak 22 Mei 1972 bergerak di bidang Perbankan yang memberikan pelayanan jasa penyimpanan uang dalam bentuk tabungan dan deposito serta menyalurkan kredit kepada masyarakat umum dan pegawai negeri.
Landasan hukum pendirian Perusahaan Daerah Bank Kredit Kecamatan (PD BKK) Sidorejo adalah Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor : 19 Tahun 2002 tentang Perusahaan Daerah Bank Kredit Kecamatan Provinsi Jawa Tengah. Dalam pelaksanaannya berdasarkan Keputusan Gubernur  Jawa TengahNomor : 115 Tahun 2003 tentang Petunjuk pelaksanaan Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor : 19 tahun 2002 tentang Perusahaan daerah Bank Kredit Kecamatan Provinsi Jawa Tengah.
Visi, Misi dan Tujuan
Visi PD BKK Sidorejo adalah membantu dan mendorong pertumbuhan perekonomian dan pembangunan daerah kota Salatiga di segala bidang. Sedangkan misinya adalah sebagai salah satu sumber pendapatan daerah dalam rangka meningkatkan taraf hidup rakyat.
Tujuannya adalah :
-          Mendekatkan modal pada golongan masyarakat ekonomi menengah ke bawah
-          Melindungi pengusaha kecil dari rentenir
-          Pemerataan kesempatan berusaha bagi masyarakat ekonomi lemah
-          Meningkatkan kesadaran masyarakat gemar menabung

Struktur Organisasi dan Personalia
Struktur organisasi PD BKK Sidorejo terdiri Pembina, Dewan Pengawas, Direksi dan Seksi-Seksi. Pembina dari  Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Tengah adalah Gubernur Jawa Tengah c.q.Biro Perekonomian Provinsi Jawa Tengah. Sedangkan Pembina Pemerintah Kota Salatiga terdiri 2 orang yaitu Agus Parmadi PT, SE, M.Si (Ketua) dan Yuvita Norma Evarini, SH.  Direksi adalah Agus Joko Susilo, SE dibantu seksi kredit, dana, umum, pembuku, kasir, seksi Pengelola Data Elektronik dan staf karyawan. Sampai dengan bulan November 2010, jumlah karyawan PD BKK Sidorejo sebanyak 9 orang dengan jenjang pendidikan 2 orang sarjana, 2 orang diploma dan 5 orang lulus SLTA.
Pelayanan
PD BKK Sidorejo menawarkan tabungan dengan nama Tamades seri  A dan tabungan berjangka (deposito) Tamades seri B dengan jangka waktu 1, 3, 6  dan 12 bulan. Pelayanan kredit kepada PNS dan TNI/POLRI serta kredit umum kepada petani, pedagang dan pengusaha mikro kecil serta wirausaha. Disamping itu PD BKK Sidorejo juga memberikan jasa layanan pembayaran rekening listrik dan listrik secara on line kepada masyarakat Salatiga.
Nasabah penabung PD BKK Sidorejo 31 Desember Tahun 2011: deposan : 785 orang, tabungan : 2.193 orang dan nasabah kredit sebanyak  1.163 orang. Pelayanan nasabah di kantor kas dan system petugas PD BKK Sidorejo langsung di alamat nasabah yang bersangkutan.

Kondisi Kuangan dan Kinerja Perbankan
Pemilik PD BKK Sidorejo adalah Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Tengah dan Pemerintah Kota Salatiga. Tahun 2011 modal disetor sebanyak Rp. 2.5000.000.000; yang bersumber  dari Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Tengah sebesar Rp. 1.050.000.000; ( 42 % ) dan Pemerintah Kota Salatiga sebesar Rp. 1.450.000.000; ( 58 % ).
Penghimpunan dana bersumber dari deposito direncanakan Rp. 5.570.000.000;  terealisasi Rp. 5.427.000.000; atau tercapai 98 %. Sedangkan tabungan direncankan Rp.4.144.000.000; terealisasi Rp.4.062.231.867;. Penyaluran dana kredit tahung anggaran 2011 tercapai Rp.11.190.478.506; dari target RKAP sebesar Rp. 12.050.000.000; atau tercapai 92,80 %.  Jumlah kredit tersebut meliputi : kredit pegawai Rp. 10.420.153.014 sebanyak 1.107 orang, kredit perdagangan sebesar Rp.308.459.232; sebanyak 25 orang dan kredit jasa sebesar Rp. 481.866.260; sebanyak 31 orang.
Tabel
PD BKK Sidorejo
Neraca Per 31 Desember 2011

Pendapatan operasional PD BKK Sidorejo tahun 2011 sebesar Rp. 2,280,645,445; dan setelah diperhitungkan biaya operasional diperoleh laba sebesar Rp.401.605.594;.  Namun pada kegiatan non operasional Tahun 2011 mengalami kerugian sebesar Rp. 31.493.485;.  Setelah diperhitungkan pajak,  PD BKK Sidorejo tahun 2011 memperoleh laba bersih sebesar Rp.323.848.095;
Tabel
PD BKK Sidorejo
Pendapatan dan Biaya
Per 31 Desember 2011
No
Uraian
Jumlah
1
Pendapatan Operasional
         2,280,645,445
2
Biaya Operasional
         1,879,039,851
3
Laba Operasional
            401,605,594
4
Pendapatan Non Operasional
              22,718,898
5
Biaya Non Operasional
              54,212,383
6
Rugi Non Operasional
             (31,493,485)
7
Laba Tahun Berjalan
            370,112,109
8
Pajak
              46,264,014
9
Laba
            323,848,095


Kolektibilitas kredit akhir tahun 2011 dari jumlah Rp.11.190.478.505; dengan jumlah nasabah 1.127 orang dengan kolektibilitas  sebagai berikut :

No
Kolektibilitas
Jumlah  ( Rupiah )
Nasabah (orang)
1
Lancar
10.105.187.845
823
2
Kurang lancer
96.439.956
8
3
Diragukan
254.094.150
18
4
Macet
734.756.554
314

Kinerja keuangan PD BKK Sidorejo dinyatakan sehat dengan Non Performing Loans sekitar 9,7 %. Adapun ratio keuangan PD BKK Sidorejo adalah CAR : 22,31 % (Sehat), KAP :7,50 % (Sehat), PPAP : 100 % (Sehat), ROE : 2,98 % (Sehat), BOPO : 82,39 % (Sehat), Likuiditas : 28,34 % (Sehat).



2.    PD BPR BANK  SALATIGA
PD BPR Bank Salatiga adalah lembaga keuangan perbankan miliki Pemerintah Kota Salatiga. Keberadaannya merupakan salah satu alat kelengkapan otonomi daerah dalam bidang keuangan yang menjalankan usahanya sebagai Bank Perkreditan Rakyat sesuai dengan ketentuan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. PD BPR Bank Salatiga dalam operasionalnya memprioritaskan pada pemberdayaan potensi masyarakat Salatiga, dalam bentuk penggalangan dana dari masyarakat dan menyalurkannya kembali untuk mendorong kesejahteraan masyarakat.
Kantor Pusat PD BPR Bank Salatiga di Jalan Diponegoro Nomor 10 Salatiga dan Kantor Cabang di Jalan Soekarno Hatta Harjosari Nomor 8 Bawen  Kabupaten Semarang dan Kantor Kas di Lingkungan Kantor Pemkot Salatiga.
PD BPR Bank Salatiga dibentuk berdasarkan Peraturan Daerah Kota Kecil Nomor : 50 Tanggal 30 Maret 1953 tentang Bank Pasar yang diundangkan dalam lembaran Provinsi Jawa Tengah tanggal 30 November 1953 (Tambahan seri B Nomor 15) Jo, Peraturan Daerah Kotamadya Salatiga tanggal 25 Januari 1973 tentang Peraturan Daerah Bank Pasar yang telah disahkan oleh Gubernur Kepala Daerah Provinsi Jawa tengah tanggal 5 Nopember 1973 Nomor Hukum G.6/2/20 dan diundangkan dalam Lembaran Daerah Jateng Seri B Nomor 30 Tahun 1973 dan diperbaharui dengan Peraturan Daerah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II  Salatiga Nomor  4 Tahun 1989 dan diubah melalui Perda Nomor 2 Tahun 1995 serta diubah kembali melalui Perda Nomor 5 Tahun 2007 dan Perda Nomor 2 Tahun 2009 tentang Perusahaan Daerah Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Bank Salatiga.
Pemberian ijin usaha sebagai Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Kota Salatiga berdasarkan Keputusan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia No.: KEP-323/LM-17/1997, dan mendapatkan persetujuan Penggunaan Izin Usaha Perusahaan Daerah Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Kota Salatiga sesuai Keputusan Pimpinan Bank Indonesia Nomor : 11/14/Kep.PBI/Sm/2009 serta dilakukan perubahan menjadi Perusahaan Daerah Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Kota Salatiga sesuai persetujuan Bank Indonesia lewat surat Nomor : 11/1452/DKBU/IDAd/Sm tanggal 28 Agustus 2009.
1)    Visi
Menjadikan PD BPR Bank Salatiga sebagai lembaga keuangan yang terpercaya, dengan selalu mengutamakan pelayanan terbaik sebagai perwujudan PD BPR Bank Salatiga menjadi Mitra Usaha Sejati Nasabah.

2)   Misi
a) Menjaga Tingkat Kesehatan Bank,
b)  Menghimpun dana dari masyarakat,
c)  Mengembangkan usaha bagi pedagang kecil dan menengah serta melakukan pembinaan kepada debitur pengelolaan modal kerja,
d)   Meningkatkan mutu sumber daya manusia melalui Pendidikan dan Pelatihan,
e)    Memberi kontribusi pembangunan Kota Salatiga dengan menjadi sumber Pendapatan Asli Daerah yang diandalkan.

Layanan usaha
Sesuai dengan UU Perbankan, kegiatan operasional PD BPR Bank Salatiga bertujuan untuk :
a.  Menghimpun dana dari masyarakat dalam bentuk Tabungan dan Deposito
b. Memberikan kredit dan melakukan pembinaan khususnya terhadap pengusaha golongan kecil dan menengah mikro
c.  Melakukan kerjasama dengan Bank Perkreditan Rakyat dan lembaga perbankan atau keuangan lainnya
d. Melaksanakan usaha-usaha perbankan lainnya sepanjang tidak bertentangan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
Lebih dari 19 tahun PD BPR Bank Salatiga menjadi mitra usaha masyarakat khususnya pedagang kecil dan menengah. Melalui produk unggulan Tabungan Masa Depan (Tamasdep), Deposito maupun kredit umum/ Pedagang/ Pegawai membuat PD BPR Bank Salatiga semakin dekat di hati masyarakat.
Berbekal komitmen yang kuat untuk menjadi mitra usaha sejati, PD BPR Bank Salatiga senantiasa berupaya meningkatkan pelayanan kepada nasabah lama/ calon nasabah. Keikutsertaan BPR dalam program penjaminan dana pihak ketiga dengan pemerintah melalui Bank Indonesia merupakan salah satu upaya untuk menjaga kepercayaan nasabah, sehingga seluruh dana masyarakat yang ada pada PD BPR Bank Salatiga dijamin oleh pemerintah melalui Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan.
Beragamnya jenis investasi pada beberapa tahun terakhir membuat calon investor harus hati-hati dalam menempatkan dananya. Investasi yang diharapkan adalah jenis investasi yang menguntungkan dan aman (risiko minimal). High risk high return adalah idiom yang sering digunakan para investor. Pada umumnya, investor yang mengharapkan return yang besar tentunya dihadapkan pada risiko yang besar pula. Berpijak pada hal tersebut, PD BPR Bank Salatiga menawarkan jenis investasi yang aman (bebas risiko) akan tetapi mendapatkan return yang cukup besar. Jenis investasi tersebut adalah deposito berjangka.
Penawaran produk simpanan oleh PD BPR BANK Salatiga dimaksudkan untuk memberikan kesempatan berinvestasi dengan tingkat keuntungan yang cukup besar dan jaminan atas pengembalian modal. Hal ini sangat penting karena investasi yang dapat memberikan jaminan modal kembali tidaklah banyak. Tujuannya adalah untuk menambah struktur modal kerja PD BPR BANK Salatiga, sehingga perusahaan dapat memperluas layanan kredit bagi nasahah.
Layanan simpanan yang telah dikembankan PD BPR Bank Salatiga meliputi : Tabungan masa Depan, Tabungan Wajib, Tabungan Sekolah, Tahapan BPR, Teladan dan Tabungan Arisan. Sedangkan Deposito dikembangkan dengan jangka waktu 1 bulan, 3 bulan, 6 bulan dan 12 bulan.
Kredit yang diberikan PD BPR Bank Salatiga adalah fasilitas dari Bank kepada Debitur berdasarkan persetujuan dan akta kesepakatan pinjam meminjam  dan debitur diwajibkan untuk melunasi hutangmya dalam jangka waktu tertentu beserta bunga sesuai akta kesepakatan. Jangka waktu kredit yang diberikan antara 1 bulan sampai dengan 180 bulan. Untuk restrukturisasi kredit dilakukan pada kredit dengan saldo kredit hanya sebesar pokok.
Struktur Organisasi dan Sumber  Daya Manusia

Organisasi PD BPR Bank Salatiga terdiri dari Pengawas, Direktur Utama, Direktur, seorang Kepala Cabang serta 2 (orang) Kepala bagian. Pengawas terdiri 3 orang yaitu H. Sukiman, SE (Ketua), Sri Wityowati, SE (Sekretaris) dan Drs. Fakruroji (Anggota). Direktur Utama adalah M. habib Saleh, SE, MM, Direktur : dan Kepala Cabang Bawen : Sapto Sri Winarno, SH. Adapun komposisi karyawan berdasarkan jenjang pendidikan seperti tampak pada tabel berikut :

Tabel

Jumlah Karyawan PD BPR Bank Salatiga

Berdasarkan Jenjang Pendidikan

No

Pendidikan

Jumlah

1

Strata 2

2

2

Strata 1

20

3

Diploma III

4

4

SLTA

13

5

SLTP

1

 

J u m l a h

40

Sumber : Laporan Tahunan PD BPR Bank Salatiga tahun 2011

 


Kondisi Keuangan dan Kinerja Perbankan
Kepemilikan modal dasar PD BPR Bank Salatiga adalah 100 % milik Pemerintah Kota Salatiga. Modal dasar sebesar Rp. 40.000.000.000; dengan rincian modal disetor Tahun 2011 sebesar Rp.15.000.000.000; .
Seperti yang terlihat pada tabel berikut, asset PD BPR Bank Salatiga Tahun 2011 mengalami kenaikan sekitar 2,97 %. Asset Tahun 2010 sebesar Rp. 95.981.791.775; tahun 2011 naik menjadi sebesar Rp. 98.831.481.789;. Perkembangan asset tersebut sebagian besar diakibatkan kenaikann asset lancar sekitar 3,14 %, sedangkan asset tetap mengalami penuruan sekitar 5,48 %.  Pada asset lancar kenaikan yang relative tinggi adalah peningkatan volume kredit sekitar 8,15 %. Sedangkan pada asset tetap yang mengalami penurunan adalah asset tetap dan inventaris sekitar ( 6, 03 %). 
Tabel
PD BPR Bank Salatiga
Neraca Gabungan Per 31 Desember 2010 dan 2011
Sumber : Laporan Tahunan PD BPR Bank Salatiga

Seperti yang terliha5t pada table berikut, Tahun 2011 laba netto PD BPR Bank Salatiga naik sekitar 58,04 % dari Rp. 1.037.812.039; (Tahun 2010) menjadi Rp. 1.640.161.562; (Tahun 2011). Sebagian besar kenaikan ini diakibatkan kenaikan pendapatan operasi yaitu sekitar 18,11 % dari Rp. 5.726.465.781; menjadi Rp.6.763.282.937;.

Tabel
PD BPR Bank Salatiga
Laporan Laba/Rugi Gabungan  Per 31 Desember 2010 dan 2011


Sumber : Laporan Tahunan PD BPR Bank Salatiga

Kinerja keuangan PD BPR Bank Salatiga tahun 2011 dinyatakan sehat dengan nilai  98,75 predikat sehat.  Hal ini diperlihatkan dari 5 komponen yang menjadi indicator penilaian kesehatan perbankan yaitu (1) Permodalan : 30 %, (2) KAP : 30 %; (3) Manajemen : 20 %; (4)Rentabilitas : 10 % dan (5) Likuiditas : 8, 75 %.
Sementara kinerja pengelolaan kredit memperlihatkan Non Performing Loans (NPL) bruto Tahun 2011 sekitar : 3,97 % dan NPL netto sekitar : 2,73 %. Adapun komposisi kolektibilitas kredit PD BPR Bank Salatiga seperti table berikut ini.

3.    Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (PDAM)

Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum  Kota Salatiga sebagai Badan Usaha Milik Daerah ( BUMD ) sudah dirintis oleh Pemerintah Belanda sejak tahun 1921. Pada tahun 1968 Surat Keputusan  Walikota madya Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Salatiga Nomor : 44/Kepda/Um-Pan tanggal 30 Desember 1967 dan Surat Keputusan Dewan  Perwakilan  Rakyat Daerah Gotong Royong ( DPRD –GR ) Nomor : 8/DPRD-GR/Um-Pan tanggal 18 Mei 1968, penyediaan air minum dikelola oleh Dinas Air Minum. Pada tahun 1969 Statrus Dinas Air Minum berubah menjadi Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum ( PDAM ) sesuai SK. Walikotamadya  Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Salatiga Nomor : 8.a/Kepda/Um-Pan  tanggal 1 April 1971 dan Peraturan Daerah Kotamadya Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Salatiga Nomor 20 Tahun 1969.
Dalam perkembangannya dasar hukum pendirian  PDAM  Kota  Salatiga telah mengalami beberapa kali perubahan, terakhir ditetapkan berdasarkan Peraturan Daerah ( PERDA ) Kotamadya daerah Tingkat II Salatiga  Nomor : 5 Tahun 1981 tentang : Pendirian Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Salatiga.
a.    Visi dan Misi
1)        Visi
Visi PDAM Kota Salatiga  adalah Menjadikan perusahaan yang Maju, Mandiri, dan Profesional
Maju, artinya PDAM Kota Salatiga dari tahun ke tahun memperlihatkan pertumbuhan (kenaikan) dari sisi jumlah pelanggan, kualitas, kuantitas dan kontinuitas pelayanan, keterjangkauan tarif, kinerja keuangan, dan kontribusi PAD.
Mandiri, artinya PDAM Kota Salatiga mampu memberdayakan potensi sumber daya perusahaan dan Pemerintah Kota Salatiga untuk memenuhi biaya operasional, setoran PAD, perawatan dan pengembangan SDM serta sarana prasarana.
Professional, artinya PDAM Kota Salatiga mampu menerapkan prinsip-prinsip manajemen untuk menjamin keberlanjutan perusahaan dalam dinamika otonomi daerah dan perkembangan IPTEK didukung SDM yang handal dan berkomitmen.

2)        Misi
Misi yang diemban dalam rangka mewujudkan visi perusahaan tersebut adalah menghasilkan produk yang sesuai dengan standar Departemen Kesehatan, meningkatkan kualitas dan kuantitas serta kontinuitas suatu layanan yang lebih baik sehingga apa yang diinginkan masyarakat dapat terpenuhi.
Adapun misi perusahaan adalah:
v  Menyediakan air minum yang memenuhi standar kualitas, kuantitas dan kontinuitas.
v  Meningkatkan kemampuan sumber daya manusia menjadi pegawai yang memiliki etika, kinerja dan profesional.
v  Meningkatkan pelayanan yang terjangkau dan memberikan kepuasan pelanggan.
v  Meningkatkan cakupan pelayanan guna memenuhi kebutuhan utilitas air minum.
v  Mengelola sumber daya perusahaan yang profesional sehingga mampu memberikan pelayanan terbaik, meningkatkan kesejahteraan karyawan dan meningkatkan kontribusi bagi PAD.
v  Menjaga hubungan harmonis dan peran yang seimbang dengan stakeholder dalam peningkatan pelayanan kepada pelanggan.
Struktur Jabatan  dan Personalia
            Jumlah pegawai PDAM Kota Salatiga per 31 Desember 2011 adalah 139 orang, yang terdiri dari  : laki-laki : 116 orang ( 85 % ) dan perempuan : 23 ( 15 % ).
Tabel
Jumlah Pegawai dan Struktur Jabatan PDAM Kota Salatiga
No.
Jabatan
Jumlah orang
%
1
Direktur
1
1%
2
Kepala Bagian
3
2%
3
Kepala Cabang
1
1%
4
5
Kepala Sub. Bagian
Pelaksana
15
119
11%
85%
Jumlah
139
100%
                         Sumber : Profil PDAM Kota Salatiga

Pelayanan

Cakupan wilayah pelayanan PDAM Kota Salatiga sampai dengan akhir tahun 2011  mencapai jumlah 25.567 sambungan, sedangkan yang tercatat sebagai pelanggan aktif sebanyak 24.176 sambungan (94,56 %). Jumlah Penduduk Kota Salatiga menurut data  Dinas DUKCAPIL tahun 2011 sejumlah 174.621 sedangkan jumlah Rumah Tangga ( KK )  yang ada di Kota Salatiga yang tercantum dalam Buku Salatiga Dalam Angka Tahun 2011 sebanyalk 44.218 dan cakupan pelayanan yang dicapai secara kumulatif sebesar 71,86% dari jumlah penduduk. Adapun komposisi pelanggan PDAM  tahun 2009 sampai dengan tahun 2011 menurut jenisnya adalah sebagai berikut :
Tabel
Pelanggan Air Minum Per Jenis
Pdam Kota Salatiga

JENIS PELANGGAN

2009

2010

2011
1.    Sosial
627
627
603
2.    Non Niaga
20.901
21.592
21.765
3.    Niaga
1.879
1.897
1.585
4.    Industri
71
72
52
5.    Instansi
210
205
171
Non aktif
1.487
1.495
1.391
JUMLAH
23.688
24.393
25.567
Aktif
22.201
22.699
24.176
Sumber : Profil PDAM Kota Salatiga Tahun 2011
Mata air yang didistribusikan kepada pelanggan menggunakan dua system yaitu sistem gravitasi dan system perpompaan. Sistem perpompaan digunakan untuk melayani wilayah Salatiga yang letaknya lebih tinggi dari mata air yang ada dengan menggunakan diesel dengan bahan bakar solar maupun listrik, sedangkan untuk wilayah Salatiga yang rendah dilayani dengan sistem gravitasi. Sumber mata air yang digunakan PDAM Kota Salatiga sberasal dari wilayah  Kota Salatiga dan sebagian besar bersumber dari wilayah Kabupaten Semarang, seperti tampak pada tabel berikut :
Tabel
Mata Air Yang Digunakan
Pdam Kota Salatiga


Mata Air
Kapasitas
Produksi ( l/dt )
Terpasang ( l/dt )
1.        M.A Senjoyo
140
145
2.        M.A Kaligojek
20
20
3.        M.A Kalisombo Barat
30
35
4.        M.A Kalisombo Timur
15
15
5.        M.A Kalitaman
20
25
6.        M.A Kaligethek
20
20
7.        Sumur Sukowati
12
15
8.        Sumur Cebongan
6
8
9.        Sumur Tegalsari I
7
7
10.    Sumur Tegalsari II
10
12
11.    Sumur Kradenan
7
7
12.    Sumur Bulu
2
2
13.    Sumur Dukuh
7
7
Jumlah
296
318
Sumber : Profil PDAM Kota Salatiga
Tahun 2009-2011  perkembangan produksi dan omset (volume) penjualan air PDAM Kota Salatiga, seperti tampak pada tabel  sebagai berikut :

Tabel
Produksi Air PDAM Kota Salatiga
Tahun 2009-2011.
No.
Tahun
Produksi air ( m3 )
Air terjual ( m3 )
3
2009
7.602.725
5.661.981
4
2010
7.741.103
5.801.736
5
2011
7.999.646
6.005.402

Tingkat kebocoran produksi dan distribusi air PDAM Kota Salatiga Tahun 2009 sekitar : 25,53%, Tahun 2010 : 25,05 %  dan Tahun 2011 sekitar : 24,93 %. Rata-rata kebocoran air sekitar 25,17 % masih di atas batas maksimal tingkat kebocoran air menurur Peraturan Mendagri Nomor 23 Tahun 2006 tentang  Penetapan Dibandingkan dengan kondisi PDAM yang lainnya, kebocoran produksi dan distribusi air PDAM Kota Salatiga masih relative rendah.  Tingkat kebocoran 30 PDAM Kabupaten / Kota Di Jawa Tengah sekitar 34,94 % (Suara Merdeka 12 Februari 2013).
Tarif PDAM Kota Salatiga mengacu pada Permendagri Nomor 03 Tahun 1998 dan direvisi dengan Permendagri Nomor 23 Tahun 2006 tentang Penetapan Tarif PDAM, , tarif ditetapkan dengan Peraturan Walikota atas usulan Direksi PDAM.  Penetapan tarif PDAM Kota Salatiga didasarkan pada prinsip : (a.) keterjangkauan dan keadilan; (b). mutu pelayanan; (c). pemulihan biaya; (d.) efisiensi pemakaian air; (e.) transparansi dan akuntabilitas; dan (f. perlindungan air baku.
Sejak Tahun 2003, penyusunan tariff PDAM melibatkan pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan meliputi Akademisi, LSM, Penelitian, Badan Pengawas dan Manajemen PDAM. Tim ditetapkan berdasarkan Surat Keputusan Walikota Salatiga dengan memperhatikan aspirasi pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan. Tim bekerja secara obyektf dan independen dalam  memberikan rekomendasi kepada Direktur PDAM Kota Salatiga tentang klasifikasi dan tariff pelanggan. Usulan ini menjadi sebagai acuan Direksi PDAM  dalam mengajukan usulan tariff kepada Walikota Salatiga.
Berdasarkan Peraturan Walikota Salatiga Nomor 51 Tahun 2007 yang efektif berlaku  mulai bulan September 2007

No.

Segmentasi Tarip (Klasififikasi Pelanggan)

Tingkat Pemakaian

0 – 10 M3
Rp / M3
11 – 20 M3
Rp/M3
21 – 30 M3
Rp /  M3
> 31 M3
Rp / M3
I.
SOSIAL UMUM :





1. HU, TERMINAL AIR
545
785
970
1.360

2. MUSHOLLA
445
600
790
970

3. MASJID, GEREJA, PURA , VIHARA
550
800
1.450
1.750

SOSIAL KHUSUS :





4. PA, PANTI WA, YAY. SOSIAL
600
850
1.550
1.860
II.
RUMAH TANGGA :





1. RT. A
625
875
1.715
2.445

2. RT. B
1.065
1.565
2.600
3.055

3. RT. C
1.565
2.115
3.150
3.910

RUMAH PEMONDOKAN





1.   RPK.  A.
1.565
2.115
3.110
3.765

2.   RPK.  B.
2.115
2.365
3.265
3.915

3.   RPK.  C.
2.250
2.800
3.590
4.245
III
USAHA :





1.  USAHA KECIL
1.955
3.335
4.285
6.295

2.  USAHA MENENGAH
2.315
3.805
5.185
6.660

3.  USAHA BESAR
2.560
3.985
5.565
7.035
IV
INDUSTRI :





1. INDUSTRI KECIL
2.450
4.785
5.565
6.490

2. INDUSTRI MENENGAH
2.960
4.955
5.935
7.035

3. INDUSTRI BESAR
3.325
5.140
6.265
7.420
V.
INSTANSI





1. PEMERINTAH
2.450
4.530
5.565
6.490

2.  VERTIKAL
2.450
4.530
5.565
6.490

3.  SWASTA
2.450
4.530
5.565
6.490
VI
KHUSUS





  • LBG. ASING, RT WNA.
3.115
4.955
5.940
7.050
  • REFIL/ISI ULANG AIR
5.760
8.620
10.845
12.780
Keterangan :
Pembayaran minimum 10 m3 artinya perhitungan  minimal pembayaran beban ekuivalen 10 m3

.
Jumlah kekayaan Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Kota Salatiga semakin meningkat selama tiga tahun terakhir dari tahun 2009 – 2011 sebagai berikut :
No
Pos-Pos
2009
2010
2011
1.
Aktiva Lancar
5.350.506
4.847.795
4.522.192
2.
Aktiva Tetap
12.210.762
12.191.867
13.459.745
3.
Aktiva Lain-lain
1.888.592
2.886.090
1.934.675
Sumber : Profil PDAM Kota Salatiga

Laba Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Kota Salatiga selama tiga tahun atau tahun 2009 sampai dengan  2011 adalah sebagai berikut :

Tabel
Laba Perusahaan 2009-2011
URAIAN
2009
2010
2011
Laba Usaha
2.797.074
2.815.138
2.887.003
Pajak PPh.
707.632
655.833
681.183
Laba bersih
2.089.442
2.159.305
2.205.820
         Sumber : Profil PDAM Kota Salatiga


Capaian hasil kinerja Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Kota Salatiga berdasarkan Permendagri Nomor 47 Tahun 1998 yang dihitung dari Aspek Keuangan, Aspek Operasional dan administrasi sejumlah 30 variabel dari tahun 2009 sampai dengan  tahun 2011 menggambarkan kondisi sebagai berikut  :
Disamping penilaian kinerja sebagaimana diatur dengan Permendagri 47 Tahun 1998 PDAM kota Salatiga telah dinilai dengan sistem Brandmarking oleh UNDP yang bekerjasama dengan PERPAMSI, dengan menilai 100 variabel yang menyangkut aspek keuangan, tingkat layanan kepada pelanggan, operasional dan sebagainya. Dari 15 PDAM yang berada di Jawa Tengah dan DIY PDAM Kota Salatiga memperoleh Nilai Tertinggi (Sangat Baik), Hasil Audit BPKP memperoleh Predikat WTP  ( Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian ).
Selain dari Kinerja yang semakin baik menurut penilaian dari BPKP Perwakilan Jateng PDAM Kota Salatiga menduduki urutan Pertama Pencapaian Kinerja terbaik di Jawa Tengah tahun 2008.
Dari pencapaian hasil Kinerja tersebut pada tahun 2009 PDAM Kota Salatiga mendapatkan PERPAMSI AWARD yang diserahkan oleh Kementerian  PU di Batam tanggal    Desember 2009 dan diterimakan kepada Walikota Salatiga, sedangkan untuk Direktur PDAM Kota Salatiga menerima Anugerah Manager Profesional tahun 2009 dari Lembaga Independent  Diantara 20 orang Profesional seluruh Indonesia.

4.        PERUSAHAAN DAERAH  ANEKA USAHA (PDAU)
Perusahaan Daerah  Aneka Usaha (PDAU) Kota Salatiga berdiri berdasarkan Peraturan Daerah (Perda) Nomor 2 Tahun 2004 tentang Perusahaan Daerah  Aneka Usaha dan Peraturan Walikota Nomor : 48 Tahun 2007 tentang Perubahan Peraturan Walikota Nomor : 61 Tahun 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Perusahaan Daerah  Aneka Usaha Kota Salatiga.
a.    Visi dan Misi
1)   Visi
Menjadikan PDAU sebagai Badan Usaha yang maju, mandiri, bersaing, dan terpercaya,
2)   Misi
a)        Membuka peluang untuk meningkatkan pendapatan daerah,
b)        Mendukung penyediaan dan pembangunan menuju kemandirian daerah,
c)        Meningkatkan lapangan kerja, dan mendorong semangat kewirausahaan dikalangan aparatur dan masyarakat,
d)       Menjaga keseimbangan harga dan pemenuhan kebutuhan daerah dalam sistem pasar bebas.
b.   Struktur Organisasi
PDAU Kota Salatiga dipimpin seorang Direksi, dibantu seorang Sekretaris dan didukung 3 Kepala Unit Usaha serta Badan Pengawas. Direksi Sdr. Murwanto Yusup, SH dan 2 orang Badan Pengawas yaitu Sukiman, SE (Ketua) dan Titik Indarti, SH, M.Si (Anggota).
c.    Permodalan
Kepemilikan modal PDAU adalah 100 % Pemerintah Kota Salatiga. Total penyerataan modal sebesar Rp. 4.952.340.000; dengan  rincian sebagai berikut :
Tabel
Rincian Penyertaan Modal Pemerintah Kota Salatiga
Pada PDAU Kota Salatiga
No
Waktu Penyertaan
Jumlah
Bentuk Penyertaan
1.
1 Oktober 2002
1.258.848.000
445.400.000
5.000.000
15.000.000
275.752.000
Pengadaan Tanah dan Bangunan SPBU
Tangki, Mesin dan sarana pompa bensin
Biaya Notaris
Biaya Balik Nama Usaha dan Sertifikat
Biaya Operasional dan Modal Kerja
2.
8 November
150.000.000
Untuk SPBU
3.
Tahun 2003
171.941.000
Mesin Pompa untuk SPBU
4.
5.
28 Mei 2004
Mei 2004
329.684.000
715.000
Untuk SPBU
Belanja Operasi dan Pemeliharaan
6.
31 Agustus 2004
100.000.000
Untuk SPBU
7.
8.
11 Desember 2006
29 Desember 2006

600.000.000
1.100.000.000
500.000.000
Untuk SPBU
Untuk Unit Usaha Pertokoan
Untuk Unit Usaha Perbengkelan

Total
4.952.340.000

Sumber : Sumber : Laporan Pertanggungjawaban  Tahunan PDAU Kota Salatiga Tahun 2011

d.   Unit Usaha
Unit usaha yang dioperasionalkan PDAU Kota Salatiga meliputi SPBU, Pertokoan dan Perbengkelan. Adapun perkembangan usaha PDAU Kota Salatiga adalah
1.    Unit Usaha SPBU
1.         Unit usaha SPBU masih menjadi contributor utama pemasukan pendapatan PDAU. Dengan upaya untuk mempertahankan sertifikasi ‘Pasti Pas’ kategori silver melalui proses audit yang secara berkala dilaksanakan, sampai dengan akhir tahun  2011. Konsistensi pelayanan dan kualitas produk yang ditawarkan masih memenuhi standar untuk tetap menyandang SPBU dengan sertifikasi ‘Pasti Pas’ kategori silver.
2.         Dengan adanya jaminan pelayanan dan produk yang diberikan, penjualan BBM melalui kupon BBM kepada SKPD yang ada pada Pemerintah Kota Salatiga masih tetap berjalan baik serta menunjukkan adanya peningkatan
2.    Unit Usaha Perbengkelan
1.    Para karyawan menawarkan produk dan jasa yang dapat dilayani oleh unit usaha perbengkelan PDAU kepada masyarakat dan khususnya kepada SKPD Pemerintah Kota Salatiga
2.    Peningkatan mutu pelayanan, unit usaha perbengkelan memberikan kemudahan bagi calon konsumen khususnya dari lingkup SKPD dengan pelayanan antar jemput bagi kendaraan Dinas yang memerlukan perbaikan maupun pergantian olie atau spart part
3.    Unit Usaha Pertokoan
Usaha pertokoan memiliki 3 (tiga) sub unit usaha yaitu penjualan ATK (alat tulis kantor), Mini Market dan Penjualan mebelair dan elektronika secara kredit. Peningkatan produktivitas dan nilai jual dilakukan dengan cara :
- Untuk meningkatkan omset  penjualan ATK ditingkatkan kegiatan operasionalnya dan dilengkapi mesin foco yang ditempatkan di jalan Hasanudi 114 Salatiga
- Peningkatan pendapatan dan pelayanan konsumen dilakukan kerja sama dengan pihak penyedia barang dilakukan penjulan secara kredit sepeda motor dan alat elektronik khususnya laptop. Hal ini sebagai respon dalam memanfaatkan trend / peluang usaha yang saat ini banyak diminati masyarakat dan memberikan peluang kontribusi pendapatan positif bagi perusahaan
Dalam kegiatan operasional  PDAU Kota Salatiga perlu dilakukan  perbaikan-perbaikan guna peningkatan jumlah pendapatan dan penataan manajemen perusahaan. Hambatan-hambatan  yang dihadapi dalam kegiatan operasional dan pengembangan usaha PDAU sebagai berikut :
1.              SKPD di lingkungan Pemerintah Kota Salatiga sebagai salah satu potensi pasar strategis masih relative sedikit yang menggunakan / membeli barang kebutuhan kantor terutama kebutuhan ATK dan jasa perbengkelan yang disediakan PDAU
2.              Peningkatan kualitas SDM para petugas guna meningkatkan pelayanan kepada masyarakat / konsumen
3.              Penyadaran karyawan dalam melaksanakan tugas pokok dan fungsinya sebagai bagian tanggung jawab dalam pekerjaannya
4.              Kebijakan pendukung pelaksanaan pengangkatan karyawan untuk dapat diangkat sebagai pejabatan structural dalam proses penataan manajerial perusahaan. Kepastian penempatan jabatan structural menjadi dasar memberikan kewenangan serta dapat meminta pertanggungjawaban pasti atas hasil kerja pejabat structural yang telah ditetapkan.
Seperti yang terlihat pada neraca berikut, Tahun 2011 PDAU Kota Salatiga memperlihatkan asset,  kewajiban dan ekuitas sebesar Rp. 5.206.727.930; naik sekitar   1,27 % dibandingkan Tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp. 5.141.279.802;. Aset PDAU Kota Salatiga terdiri asset lancer sebesar Rp. 2.110.352.279; dan asset tetap sebesar Rp. 2.763.428.855; serta asset lainnya sebesar Rp. 332.946.796;.  Sementara itu kewajiban tahun 2011 sebesar Rp. 166.730.956; naik sekitar 11,76 % dibandingkan Tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp. 149.188.500;. Ekuitas PDAU Kota Salatiga Tahun 2011 sebesar Rp. 5.039.996.974; naik sekitar 0,96 % dibandingkan Tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp.4.992.091.302;.
Tabel
Perusahaan Daerah Aneka Usaha Kota Salatiga
Neraca Per 31 Desember 2010 dan 2011
Sumber : Laporan Pertanggungjawaban  Tahunan PDAU Kota Salatiga Tahun 2011


Jumlah penjualan (omset) Pada Laporan laba/rugi Tahun 2011 PDAU Kota Salatiga sebesar Rp. 21.834.764.430; naik 0,95 % dibandingkan tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp.21.628.566.910. Setelah diperhitungkan beban (biaya) operasional, Tahun 2010 mengalami kerugian sebesar Rp.100.624.689; dan Tahun 2011 mengalami kerugian sebesar Rp.42.033.335; atau turun 58,23 %.  Kegiatan di luar usaha utama ternyata PDAU Kota Salatiga pada tahun 2011 memperoleh pendapatan lain-lain (netto) sebesar Rp. 120.806.463; turun sekitar 9,22% dibandingkan pendapatan lain-lain Tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp.130.079.858;. Pada akhir tahun anggaran 2011 PDAU Kota Salatiga mendapatkan laba bersih RP. 61.230.672; naik sekitar 88,66% dibandingkan Tahun 2010 yaitu sebesar Rp. 32.455.169;.

Tabel
Perusahaan Daerah Aneka Usaha Kota Salatiga
Laporan Laba Rugi  Per 1 Januari s.d. 31 Desember 2010 dan 2011




Sumber : Laporan Pertanggungjawaban  Tahunan PDAU Kota Salatiga Tahun 2011



B.     Kontribusi BUMD Dalam Pendapatan Asli Daerah  Kota Salatiga

Menurut  Undang-Undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah disebutkan bahwa sumber pendapatan daerah terdiri dari Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Bagi Hasil Pajak dan Bukan Pajak. Pendapatan Asli Daerah sendiri terdiri dari:   pajak daerah,  retribusi daerah,  hasil pengolahan kekayaan daerah yang dipisahkan, dan  lain-lain PAD yang sah.
Hasil pengelolaan kekayaan daerah yang dipisahkan bersumber dari laba Badan Usaha Milik Daerah. Perencanaan program  BUMD baik PD BPR BKK Sidorejo, PD BPR  Bank Salatiga, PDAM, dan PDAU Kota Salatiga menjadi bagian integral dalam tata kelola keuangan  APBD.  Setiap awal tahun anggaran, setiap Direksi akan menyusun Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Tahunan (RKAT) yang menjelaskan program, dan rencana setoran PAD dari proyeksi bisnis dan laba yang akan dilaksanakan. Berdasarkan RKAT yang ditetapkan (disahkan) Walikota maka setiap BUMD akan melaksanakan layanan usaha sesuai visi dan misi serta ketentuan standard pelayanan miniman dan standard prosedur baku. Masing-masing Perusahaan Daerah akan mengikuti standard teknik manajerial sesuai ketentuan Kementeriaan / Lembaga yang menjadi lembaga pembinanya. Pengendalian Perusahaan Daerah dilakukan oleh Badan Pengawas yang ditetapkan dan bertanggung jawab kepada Walikota Salatiga sebagai representasi pemilik perusahaan daerah.
Tabel Kontribusi BUMD Terhadap PAD – APBD Kota Salatiga
Tahun 2006 - 2011
Sumber : LKPJ Walikota Salatiga Tahun 2006 s.d. 2011 (diolah)

Tahun 2006-2011 BUMD sebagai lembaga yang memberdayakan kekayaan yang dipisahkan menyerahkan laba dalam perhitungan  PAD Kota Salatiga terendah sebesar Rp. 684.131.589; dan tertinggi Rp.2.964.213.854; dengan rata-rata sebesar Rp. 1.717.037.702;. Kontribusi setoran BUMD terhadap PAD selama 6 tahun terendah 1,89 %, tertinggi : 4,80 % dan rata-rata sekitar : 3,53 %. 
Relatif rendahnya kontribusi BUMD dalam PAD pada pos penerimaan APBD Kota Salatiga disebabkan oleh beberapa factor sebagai berikut :
a.         Keterbatasan wilayah administrasi Pemerintah Kota Salatiga. Wilayah kota Salatiga terdiri 4 kecamatan dan 22 kelurahan. Kondisi ini menjadi penghambat dan kendala dalam penigkatan volume usaha Perusahaan Daerah Kota Salatiga.  Sebagai contoh PDAM mengalami kendala dalam pengembangan sumber mata air. Hal ini berakibat keterbatasan sumber air bahan baku. PDAU mengalami kendala melakukan ekspansi layanan SPBU demikian pula PD Bank Salatiga dan BKK dalam meningkatkan pangsa pasar usahnya.  Kerja sama dengan daerah lain dalam pengembangan usaha menghadapi kendala regulasi dan managemen skill pengelola dalam tata kelola kerja sama
b.        Penduduk Salatiga sekitar 173.000, relative terbatas untuk pengembangan (ekspansi) pasar BUMD baik PDAM, PD BPR, BKK dan PDAU. Inovasi pengembangan usaha yang berbasis ‘mutu’ dan variasi (diversifikasi) usaha memerlukan tambahan investasi dan politic will Walikota dan DPRD Kota Salatiga. Sebagai contoh pemikiran layanan air PDAM ‘siap minum’ dan atau pembedaan ‘layanan air sumber dan air olahan’ membutuhkan investasi dan aplikasi teknologi.
c.         Dukungan regulasi dan politic will Walikota dan DPRD Kota Salatiga dalam peningkatan investasi, dan pengembangan good corporate governance belum optimal dalam peningkatan kapasitas skala bisnis, rentabilitas dan ekspansi / diversifikasi usaha BUMD Kota Salatiga. Sementara sumber-sumber PAD yang lain seperti pajak daerah dan retribusi daerah relative ‘dinamik’ karena dukungan regulasi ‘Pemerintah-Pusat’ dan meningkatnya kegiatan ekonomi masyarakat.
d.        Kapasitas dan profesionalitas Manajemen dan kepemimpinan BUMD Kota Salatiga masih relative belum berimbang antar Perusahaan Daerah. Sebagai contoh profesionalitas tata kelola PD Bank Salatiga dan BKK mendapat support dan pengawasan oleh Bank Indonesia, profesionalitas PDAM mendapat support Kemendagri, Kemen PU dan Perpamsi.  Sementara itu untuk PDAU harus bekerja keras dalam mengembangkan variasi usahanya kecuali SPBU yang mendapat binaan teknis dari Pertamina
e.         Lemahnya struktur  tata kelola dan pengembangan BUMD di Kota Salatiga. Koordinasi pembinaan BUMD Kota Salatiga di bawah tanggung jawab Bagian Perekonomian, sementara itu pertanggungjawaban  Direksi BUMD langsung kepada Walikota.
f.          Renstra BUMD tampaknya belum sinkron dengan penjabaran RPJMD Kota Salatiga Tahun 2006-2011 dalam perwujudan Salatiga Sejahtera, Mandiri dan Bermartabat (SMART). Hal ini membawa implikasi perbedaan program pengembangan yang dapat mendukung program-program yang relevan dengan SMART terutama dari layanan public dan dukungan pembiayaan.

Sumber: Perkuliahan Manajemen dan Administrasi Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah oleh Dr. Bambang Ismanto, M.Si